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Abstract: In this paper, we study networked systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication network. Previous studies have shown
that co-located architectures (control unit co-located with the actuators and networked sensor channel)
can ensure a high level of robustness against DoS. However, co-location requires a wired or dedicated
actuator channel, which could not meet flexibility and cost requirements. In this paper we consider a
control architecture that approximates co-location while enabling remote implementation (networked
sensor and actuator channels). We analyze closed-loop stability and quantify the robustness “gap”
between this architecture and the co-located one.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The field of cyber-physical systems is becoming more and more
important in control engineering and computer science due to
its broad spectrum of applications. Especially for safety-critical
applications, there is a need for analysis, synthesis and design
tools that can guarantee secure and reliable operations despite
the presence of malicious attacks (Cheng et al., 2017).
Security of cyber-physical systems involves several research
areas, including anomaly detection, verification, and estimation
and control in the presence of attacks. Moreover, the problem
varies depending on the type of attack one is considering.
One usually classifies cyber attacks as either deception attacks,
examples being zero-dynamics and bias injection attacks or
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The former affect the data
trustworthiness via the manipulation of packets transmitted
through the network (Fawzi et al., 2011; Teixeira et al., 2015).
DoS attacks are instead intended to affect the timeliness of the
information exchange, i.e., to induce packet losses (Amin et al.,
2009; Xu et al., 2005). In particular, it is known that DoS attacks
are relatively easy to launch (Xu et al., 2005), even without
knowledge of the targeted system.
This paper deals with DoS attacks. We consider a control
system in which plant-controller communication is networked.
An attacker can induce closed-loop instability by denying the
communication on sensor and actuator channels. The problem
of interest is to design control systems that can tolerate DoS as
much as possible. Networked control in the presence of packet
losses has been widely investigated (Hespanha et al., 2007).
However, it is known that communication failures induced by
DoS can exhibit a temporal profile quite different from the one
induced by genuine packet losses; in particular, communication
failures induced by DoS need not follow a given class of
probability distributions (Amin et al., 2009). This raises new
theoretical challenges from the perspective of analysis as well
as control design.
The literature on networked control under DoS is large and
quite diversified. In (Amin et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2010),
the authors address the problem of finding optimal control
and DoS attack strategies assuming a maximum number of
jamming actions over a prescribed control horizon. A similar
problem is considered in (Ugrinovskii and Langbort, 2014),
where the authors study zero-sum games between controllers
and strategic jammers. In (Zhang et al., 2016), the authors
investigate DoS from the attacker’s viewpoint, and characterize
optimal DoS attack scheduling strategies. Shisheh Foroush and
Martı´nez (2013) consider periodic DoS attacks. The objective is
to identify salient features of the DoS signal such as maximum
on/off cycle in order to de-synchronize the transmission times
from the occurrence of DoS. In (De Persis and Tesi, 2014b;
De Persis and Tesi, 2015), a framework is introduced where
no assumption is made regarding the “structure” of the DoS
attack. Instead, a model is considered that constrains DoS only
in terms of its frequency and duration. The contribution is an
explicit characterization of DoS frequency and duration for
which stability can be preserved through state-feedback control.
Extensions have been considered dealing with co-located robust
controller design (Feng and Tesi, 2017), nonlinear (De Persis
and Tesi, 2014a) and distributed (Senejohnny et al., 2015)
systems, as well as with systems where jamming attacks and
genuine packet losses coexist (Cetinkaya et al., 2016).
In a recent paper (Feng and Tesi, 2016), we have investigated
networked systems under DoS attacks from the perspective of
designing “maximally robust” controllers. There, it is shown
that co-located architectures (control unit co-located with the
actuators and networked sensor channel) can guarantee the
highest possible level of robustness against DoS, in the sense
that they can guarantee closed-loop stability for all the DoS
signals with frequency and duration below a certain critical
threshold beyond which stability can be lost irrespective of
the adopted control system. Unfortunately, co-location requires
wired or dedicated actuator channels, which could not meet
flexibility and cost requirements.
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In this paper, we consider a control system that approximates
co-location while enabling remote implementation (networked
sensor and actuator channels). The proposed architecture relies
on packet-based control and actuator buffering. The basic idea
is to transmit data packets containing plant input predictions
whenever DoS is absent, and use the data stored in the actuator
buffer during the periods of DoS. This idea has already proved
effective to compensate for network delay (Bemporad, 1998;
Chaillet and Bicchi, 2008) as well as packet losses (Quevedo
and Nesˇic´, 2011; Quevedo et al., 2011). In this paper, however,
the peculiarity of the problem leads to a different analysis and
design. We follow a “worst-case” type of analysis, accounting
for the situation where the network undergoes periods of DoS
much larger than the buffer capacity.
The paper contribution is twofold. First, we provide conditions
on the prediction horizon under which closed-loop stability
is preserved. The analysis is general enough to account for:
(i) process disturbances; (ii) measurement and network noise;
(iii) non-zero computation times. As a second contribution, we
explicitly quantify the robustness “gap” between this control
architecture and the co-located one, showing that the ideal
bound obtained with co-location is recovered as the prediction
horizon increases.
1.1 Notation
We denote by R the set of reals. For any α ∈ R, we denote
R≥α := {x ∈ R : x ≥ α}. We let N0 denote the set of
nonnegative integers, N0 := {0, 1, . . .}. For any α ∈ N0, we
denote Nα := {α, α + 1, . . .}. The prime denotes transpose.
Given a vector v ∈ Rn, ‖v‖ is its Euclidean norm. Given a
matrix M , ‖M‖ is its spectral norm. Given a measurable time
function f : R≥0 7→ Rn and a time interval [0, t) we denote
the L∞ norm of f(·) on [0, t) by ‖ft‖∞ := sups∈[0,t]‖f(s)‖.
Given a measurable time function f : R≥0 7→ Rn we say that
f is bounded if its L∞ norm is finite.
2. FRAMEWORK AND PAPER OUTLINE
2.1 Process dynamics and network
The process to be controlled is given by{
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + d(t)
y(t) = x(t) + n(t)
x(0) = x0
(1)
where t ∈ R≥0; x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ Rm is the control
input and y ∈ Rn is measurement vector; A and B are matrices
of appropriate size with (A,B) stabilizable; d ∈ Rn and
n ∈ Rn are unknown (bounded) disturbance and noise signals,
respectively.
We assume that sensor and actuator channels are networked and
subject to Denial-of-Service (DoS) status. The former implies
that measurements and control commands are sent only at
discrete time instants. Let {tk}k∈N0 = {t0, t1, . . .} denote the
sequence of transmission attempts. Throughout the paper, we
assume for simplicity that the transmission attempts are carried
out periodically with period ∆, i.e.,
tk+1 − tk = ∆, k ∈ N0 (2)
with t0 = 0 by convention. We refer to DoS as the phenomenon
for which some transmission attempts may fail.
We shall denote by {zm}m∈N0 = {z0, z1, . . .}, z0 ≥ t0, the
sequence of time instants at which samples of y are successfully
transmitted.
2.2 Control objective
The objective is to design a controller K, possibly dynamic, in
such a way that the closed-loop stability is maintained despite
the occurrence of DoS in measurement and control channels.
In this paper, by closed-loop stability we mean that all the
signals in the closed-loop system remain bounded for any initial
condition x0 and bounded noise and disturbance signals, and
converge to zero in the event that noise and disturbance signals
converge to zero.
2.3 Denial-of-Service: Assumptions
Clearly, the problem in question does not have a solution if the
DoS amount is allowed to be arbitrary. Following (De Persis
and Tesi, 2015), we consider a general DoS model that con-
strains the attacker action in time by only posing limitations on
the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. Let {hn}n∈N0 ,
h0 ≥ 0, denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, i.e., the
time instants at which DoS changes from zero (transmissions
are possible) to one (transmissions are not possible). Hence,
Hn := {hn} ∪ [hn, hn + τn[ represents the n-th DoS interval,
of length τn ∈ R≥0, over which the network is in DoS status. If
τn = 0, then Hn takes the form of a single pulse at hn. Given
τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ , let n(τ, t) denote the number of DoS
off/on transitions over [τ, t[, and let
Ξ(τ, t) :=
⋃
n∈N0
Hn
⋂
[τ, t] (3)
denote the subset of [τ, t] where the network is in DoS status.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. (DoS frequency). There exist constants η ∈ R≥0
and τD ∈ R>0 such that
n(τ, t) ≤ η + t− τ
τD
(4)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Assumption 2. (DoS duration). There exist constants κ ∈ R≥0
and T ∈ R>1 such that
|Ξ(τ, t)| ≤ κ+ t− τ
T
(5)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Remark 1. Assumptions 1 and 2 do only constrain a given
DoS signal in terms of its average frequency and duration. In
practice, τD can be defined as the average dwell-time between
consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η is the chattering
bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar requirement with
respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses the property that,
on the average, the total duration over which communication
is interrupted does not exceed a certain fraction of time, as
specified by 1/T . Like η, the constant κ plays the role of a
regularization term. It is needed because during a DoS interval,
one has |Ξ(hn, hn+ τn)| = τn > τn/T . Thus κ serves to make
(5) consistent. Conditions τD > 0 and T > 1 imply that DoS
cannot occur at an infinitely fast rate or be always active. 
2.4 Previous work and paper outline: co-located and remote
control architectures
In Feng and Tesi (2016), we have investigated the problem of
designing control architectures that achieve maximal robustness
against DoS. We briefly summarize the main result of that
paper. Consider the control architecture depicted in Figure 1.
The control system is co-located with the process actuators
and is equipped with prediction capabilities so as to reconstruct
the missing measurements during DoS periods. Let δ := ∆/b
be the sampling rate of the control system, where b ∈ N1.
Notice that choosing δ = ∆/b allows to differentiate between
controller sampling rate and transmission rate, maintaining ∆
possibly large. Finally, let Aδ := eAδ and Bδ :=
∫ δ
0
eAτBdτ .
The predictor equations are given by
ξ((q + 1)δ) = Aδα(qδ) +Bδu(qδ)
α(qδ) =
y(qδ), if qδ = zmξ(qδ), otherwise
ξ(0) = 0
(6)
where q ∈ N0, and the control action is given by
u(t) = Kα(qδ), t ∈ [qδ, (q + 1)δ[ (7)
Here K is a state-feedback matrix such that all the eigenvalues
of Φ = A + BK have negative real part. The control system
consists of a predictor and a state-feedback matrix. The former
emulates the process dynamics during the DoS period, and is
“reset” whenever new measurements become available.
Theorem 1. (Feng and Tesi (2016)). Consider a process as in
(1) under a co-located control system as in (6) and (7). Given
any positive definite symmetric matrix M , let P denote the
solution of the Lyapunov equation Φ′P + P Φ + M = 0. Let
the controller sampling rate δ be such that
δ ≤ 1
µA
log
[(
σ
1 + σ
)
µA
max{‖Φ‖, 1} + 1
]
(8)
when µA > 0, and
δ ≤
(
σ
1 + σ
)
1
max{‖Φ‖, 1} (9)
when µA ≤ 0, where µA is the logarithmic norm of A and σ is
a positive constant satisfying γ1−σγ2 > 0, where γ1 is equal to
the smallest eigenvalue of M and γ2 := ‖2PBK‖. Then, the
closed-loop system is stable for any DoS sequence satisfying
Assumptions 1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and with τD and
T such that
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1 (10)

The bound (10) is the best bound that one can achieve for the
class of DoS signals satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 in the sense
that at or above the threshold “1” (when 1/T + ∆/τD ≥ 1) one
can preserve stability only for some DoS signals, not for all. In
fact, as soon as we reach the threshold “1”, τD and T can give
rise to DoS signals that disrupt all the transmission attempts.
Consider, for example, the DoS signal given by (hn, τn) =
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Fig. 1. Co-located control architecture.
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Fig. 2. Remote control architecture.
(n∆, 0). This signal yields 1/T + ∆/τD = 1 and satisfies
Assumption 1 and 2 with η = 1, κ = 0, T = ∞ and τD = ∆.
By construction, this DoS signal disrupts all the transmission
attempts since it is synchronized with the transmission times.
Note that condition 1/T + ∆/τD < 1 requires τD > ∆. This
means that, on the average, DoS cannot occur at the same rate
as (or faster than) ∆.
Despite its robustness, the control architecture in (6)-(7) has a
number of practical shortcomings: co-location requires a wired
or dedicated control channel, which could not meet flexibility
and cost requirements. In order to mitigate these shortcomings,
we consider an architecture that allows for remote control. As
shown in Figure 2, we consider a “packetized-and-buffered”
architecture in which the controller transmits a sequence of
control values containing process input predictions. Whenever
communication is available, these values are stored in a buffer
and used during the DoS periods. In the remainder of this paper,
we formally investigate stability and robustness properties of
this architecture. We show that under (10) closed-loop stability
is preserved as long as the prediction horizon hδ satisfies
hδ >
ω2
ω1 + ω2
(Q+ ∆) (11)
where h is the buffer size, δ is the actuator sampling interval,
ω1 and ω2 are process-dependent constants, and Q is a DoS-
dependent constant. The above stability condition can can be
equivalently rewritten as
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1− ω2(κ+ η∆)
(ω1 + ω2)hδ − ω2∆ (12)
This inequality explicitly quantifies the gap between co-located
and remote architectures, showing that the latter approaches the
ideal bound as h→∞.
3. REMOTE CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
The actuator implements a sample-and-hold control strategy
with sampling period δ := ∆/b, b ∈ N1. The control unit
operates at the time instants zm at which process measurements
are available, returning h ∈ N1 controls
up(zm) = Kαp(zm), p = 0, . . . , h− 1 (13)
where the variable αp(zm) defines the prediction of x(zm+pδ)
at time zm. In particular, αp(zm) satisfies
α0(zm) = y(zm), (14)
αp+1(zm) = Aδαp(zm) +Bδup(zm) (15)
where p ∈ {0, . . . , h − 2} and where Aδ and Bδ are as in (6).
In practice, the control unit implements a sampled-data version
of the process dynamics, which are “reset” whenever a new
process measurement becomes available.
Let Ip(zm) := [zm + pδ,min{zm + (p + 1)δ, zm+1}[, where
p ∈ {0, . . . , h − 2}, and Ih−1(zm) := [zm + (h− 1)δ, zm+1[.
The control input applied to the process is
u(t) =

0, t ∈ [0, z0[
up(zm), t ∈ Ip(zm), p = 0, . . . , h− 2
uh−1(zm), t ∈ Ih−1(zm)
(16)
In words, the control action is kept to zero until the first process
measurement is received. Thereafter, as shown in Figure 3, over
each interval [zm, zm+1[ the actuator applies the values in the
buffer until the buffer is empty and the last value in the buffer
u(zm + (h − 1)δ) is kept until zm+1. On the other hand, if
zm+1 < zm+hδ then all the samples in the buffer are discarded
and a new sequence of controls is stored. This renders (16) a
“receding horizon” control policy.
Notice that (16) assumes that there is no noise in the actuator
channel. This is because, if the actuator receives up+nu, where
nu is a noise, the contribution of nu can be absorbed in the
process disturbance d. Also notice that (16) assumes that the
time needed to compute all the samples in (13) is zero. This
assumption can be relaxed as discussed in Section 4.
4. MAIN RESULT
We first present a lemma which is key to our developments.
Then, we analyze the closed-loop behavior within and outside
the prediction horizon and provide stability conditions.
4.1 Key lemma
The lemma relates DoS parameters and time elapsing between
successful transmissions.
Lemma 1. [Feng and Tesi (2016)] Consider a transmission
policy as in (2), along with a DoS signal satisfying Assumptions
1 and 2. If (10) holds true, then the sequence of successful
transmissions satisfies z0 ≤ Q and zm+1− zm ≤ Q+ ∆ for all
m ∈ N0, where
Q = (κ+ η∆)
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)−1
(17)

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Fig. 3. Pictorial representation of (16) over a generic interval [zm, zm+1[
where m ∈ N0. The grey area represents the prediction horizon hδ
during which the actuator utilizes the samples in the buffer, while the
blue area exceeding zm+hδ represents the period, say |Dm|, over which
communication is not possible and there is no further control update.
4.2 Closed-loop behavior within the prediction horizon
Lemma 1 guarantees that the time elapsing between successful
transmissions is always bounded under (10). In particular, z0
is finite. This makes it possible to focus the attention on the
closed-loop behavior from z0 onwards. Consider a generic
interval Ip(zm) and let
φ(t) := αp(zm)− x(t), t ∈ Ip(zm) (18)
Notice that Ip(zm) might be empty, which happens whenever
zm+1 ≤ zm + pδ. Thus, in the sequel, we implicitly consider
only the intervals Ip(zm) which are nonempty. Exploiting (18),
we can rewrite the process dynamics as
x˙(t) = Φx(t) +BKφ(t) + d(t) (19)
where Φ = A + BK. Given any symmetric positive definite
matrix M , let P be the unique solution of the Lyapunov
equation Φ′P +PΦ+M = 0. Let V (x) = x′Px. Its derivative
along the solutions to (19), satisfies
V˙ (x(t)) ≤− γ1‖x(t)‖2 + γ2‖x(t)‖‖φ(t)‖
+ γ3‖x(t)‖‖d(t)‖ (20)
where γ1 is the smallest eigenvalue of M , γ2 := ‖2PBK‖ and
γ3 := ‖2P‖. One sees that closed-loop stability depends on φ,
which, in turn, depends on the actuator sampling period δ. In
general, it is not possible to get a dissipation inequality in (20)
for an arbitrary δ. Nonetheless, this is possible provided that δ
is suitably chosen.
Lemma 2. Consider a dynamical system as in (1) under the
control action (16). Let the actuator sampling period δ be
chosen as in Theorem 1. Then, there exists a positive constant
ρ such that
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ σ‖x(t)‖+ ρ ‖wt‖∞ (21)
for all t ∈ [zm,min{zm + hδ, zm+1}[, where w = [d′ n′]′.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In view of Lemma 2, it is immediate to verify that if actuator
sampling period is properly chosen then closed-loop stability
is guaranteed since (21) induces an ISS-type of property to the
Lyapunov function. In fact, (21) yields
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ − (γ1 − σγ2)‖x(t)‖2
+ (γ2ρ+ γ3)‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞
= −γ4‖x(t)‖2 + γ5‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ (22)
where γ4 := γ1 − σγ2 and γ5 := γ2ρ+ γ3.
Observe now that for any positive real ε, the Young’s inequality
(Hardy et al., 1952) yields
2‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ ≤ 1
ε
‖x(t)‖2 + ε‖wt‖2∞ (23)
Using this inequality with ε := γ5/γ4, we obtain
V˙ (x(t))≤−ω1V (x(t)) + γ6‖wt‖2∞ (24)
where ω1 := γ4/(2α2) and γ6 := γ25/(2γ4), where α2 denotes
the largest eigenvalue of P .
Accordingly,
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−zm)V (x(zm)) + ζ1‖wt‖2∞ (25)
for all t ∈ [zm,min{zm + hδ, zm+1}[, where ζ1 := γ6/ω1.
4.3 Closed-loop behavior outside the prediction horizon
Lemma 1 guarantees that the time elapsing between successful
transmissions is always bounded under (10). Specifically, it
ensures that zm+1 − zm ≤ Q + ∆ for all m ∈ N0, where
Q is a DoS-dependent constant. Consider now a transmission
instant zm. At this time, the buffer is full. If hδ ≥ ∆ and there
is no DoS at zm+∆ then the buffer is filled again at zm+∆ and
the analysis of Section 4.2 applies. This scenario can be viewed
as a co-located one. Thus, there are two critical cases: (i) when
hδ < ∆ meaning that the prediction horizon does not cover one
transmission period; and (ii) when ∆ ≤ hδ < ∆ + Q, which
means that the network is subject to DoS periods that exceed the
prediction horizon (cf. Figure 3). We now discuss this scenario
in detail.
Let Dm := [zm + hδ, zm+1[ with Dm 6= ∅. Recall that the
prediction error satisfies
φ(t) = αh−1(zm)− x(t) (26)
for all Ih−1(zm). By hypothesis, Dm 6= ∅ which means that
zm+1 > zm+hδ. This implies that (26) is valid for t = zm+hδ.
Hence, the triangular inequality yields
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ ‖αh−1(zm)‖+ ‖x(t)‖
≤ ‖x(zm + hδ)‖+ ‖φ(zm + hδ)‖+ ‖x(t)‖ (27)
for all t ∈ Dm. We first look at φ(zm + hδ). Note that φ is
continuous on Ih−1(zm). This, along with Lemma 2, implies
that
‖φ(zm + hδ)‖ ≤ σ‖x(zm + hδ)‖+ ρ‖wzm+hδ‖∞ (28)
Combining this inequality with (27), we get
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ (1 + σ)‖x(zm + hδ)‖+ ‖x(t)‖+ ρ‖wt‖∞
(29)
for all t ∈ Dm. Then, combining (29) and (20) yields
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ (γ2 − γ1)‖x(t)‖2
+ γ2(1 + σ)‖x(t)‖‖x(zm + hδ)‖
+ (γ3 + ργ2)‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ (30)
By applying again the Young’s inequality with ε := γ3+ργ2γ1−σγ2 ,
we obtain
V˙ (x(t))≤ γ2‖x(t)‖2
+γ2(1 + σ)‖x(t)‖‖x(zm + hδ)‖+ γ7‖wt‖2∞
(31)
where γ7 :=
(γ3+ργ2)
2
2(γ1−σγ2) .
Hence, for every t ∈ Dm such that ‖x(t)‖ ≥ ‖x(zm+hδ)‖ we
have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ ω2V (x(t)) + γ7‖wt‖2∞ (32)
where ω2 := γ2(2 + σ)/α1. On the other hand, for every
t ∈ Dm such that ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ‖x(zm + hδ)‖ we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ ω2V (x(zm + hδ)) + γ7‖wt‖2∞ (33)
From these expressions, we conclude that during each interval
Dm exceeding the prediction horizon the Lyapunov function
satisfies
V (x(t)) ≤ eω2(t−zm−hδ)V (x(zm + hδ))
+ζ2e
ω2(t−zm−hδ)‖wt‖2∞ (34)
where ζ2 := γ7/ω2.
4.4 Stability analysis
The foregoing analysis indicates that the overall behevior of
the system can be regarded as the one of a switched system that
behaves stably over the intervals [zm, zm + hδ[ and unstably
over the intervals Dm. We have the following result.
Theorem 2. Consider a dynamical system as in (1) under the
control action (16). Given any positive definite symmetric ma-
trix Q, let P denote the solution of the Lyapunov equation
Φ′P + P Φ + Q = 0 with Φ = A + BK stable. Let the
actuator sampling period δ be as in Theorem 1. Consider any
DoS pattern satisfying (10). Then, the closed-loop system is
stable if the prediction horizon hδ satisfies
hδ >
ω2
ω1 + ω2
(Q+ ∆) (35)
where Q is as in Lemma 1, ω1 = γ1−σγ22α2 and ω2 =
γ2(2+σ)
α1
where γ1, γ2 and σ are as in Theorem 1 and where α1 and α2
are the smallest and largest eigenvalues of P , respectively.
Proof. Recall that z0 exists finite in view of Lemma 1. Hence,
we can restrict ourselves to study the closed-loop behavior from
z0 onwards. We also assume without loss of generality that
hδ < Q + ∆ otherwise the result follows immediately from
the analysis of Section 4.2. We show that
V (x(zm)) ≤ λe−β(zm−z0)V (x(z0)) + 2ζ(zm)
m∑
k=0
Lk
(36)
where β is defines as
β :=
ω1hδ − ω2(Q+ ∆− hδ)
Q+ ∆
(37)
and where
λ := e(ω1+ω2)Q (38)
L := e−β∆ (39)
ζ(t) := 2 max{ζ1, ζ2} eω2(Q+∆−hδ)‖wt‖2∞ (40)
Note that β > 0 in view of (35).
We prove this claim through an induction argument. The claim
trivially holds for m = 0 since λ ≥ 1. Assume next that the
claim is true up to zm with m ∈ N1. First recall that (25)
implies
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−zm)V (x(zm)) + ζ(t)
≤ λe−β(t−z0)V (x(z0)) + 2e−β(t−zm)ζ(t)
m∑
k=0
Lk + ζ(t)
(41)
for all t ∈ [zm,min{zm + hδ, zm+1}[, where the second
inequality follows from ω1 > β. Then, we have two cases.
Assume Dm = ∅, which implies that zm+1 ≤ zm + hδ. Note
that zm+1 − zm ≥ ∆ by construction. Hence, at time zm+1 we
have e−β(zm+1−zm) ≤ e−β∆ = L. This shows that (36) holds
true at zm+1. Assume next Dm 6= ∅. In view of (25) and since
V is continuous, we get
V (x(zm + hδ))≤ e−ω1hδV (x(zm)) + ζ1‖wzm+hδ‖2∞
(42)
Combining this inequality with (34) yields
V (x(t)) ≤ eω2(t−zm−hδ)V (x(zm + hδ)) + ζ(t)
≤ eω2(t−zm−hδ)[e−ω1hδV (x(zm)) + ζ(t)] + ζ(t)
≤ e−β(Q+∆)V (x(zm)) + 2ζ(t)
≤ λe−β(t−z0)V (x(z0)) + 2ζ(t)
m+1∑
k=0
Lk (43)
for all t ∈ Dm, where the third inequality follows from the fact
that t ≤ zm + Q + ∆ and the definition of β, while the last
inequality follows from the fact that e−β(Q+∆) ≤ L and the
fact that Q + ∆ + zm ≥ zm+1 ≥ t for all t ∈ Dm. Thus, (36)
holds true at zm+1.
Using this property, the proof can be easily finalized. In fact,
(41) and (43) yield
V (t)≤ λe−β(t−z0)V (x(z0)) + 2ζ(t)
m+1∑
k=0
Lk + ζ(t) (44)
for all [zm, zm+1[, and the sum term is bounded for anym since
L < 1. This concludes the proof. 
Remark 2. One sees from (35) that in order to get stability it is
not necessary that the prediction horizon covers the maximum
period of DoS. In fact, also large DoS periods can be tolerated.
In particular, one sees that robustness increases with: (i) small
values of ω2, which corresponds to mild open-loop unstable
dynamics; and (ii) large values of ω1, which corresponds to
a large decay rate of the DoS-free closed-loop dynamics. The
latter should be therefore taken into account when designing the
state-feedback matrix K. 
Remark 3. Taking into account the expression of Q from
Lemma 1, it is immediate to see that (35) can be equivalently
rewritten as (12). This shows that the considered architecture
approaches the ideal bound (10) as h → ∞. Inequality (12)
does also quantify the “gap” between remote and co-located
architectures for given any finite h. 
Remark 4. In this paper, we have assumed that the time needed
to compute h control values is zero. This assumption can be
restrictive if h is large. As discussed in Feng and Tesi (2016),
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that every time interval of
durationQ+∆ contains at least a DoS-free interval of duration
∆. This result can be generalized. In fact, one can show that if
we replace (10) with
1
T
+
µ∆
τD
< 1, µ ∈ N1 (45)
then every time interval of duration
Qµ := (κ+ ηµ∆)
(
1− 1
T
− µ∆
τD
)−1
(46)
contains at least a DoS-free interval of duration µ∆. This
property is very useful to account for non-zero computation
times Tc. In fact, this property makes it possible to regard Tc
as an extended DoS interval. The only modification is that the
sequence of control values should start from αdTc/∆e∆. 
5. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The numerical example is taken from (Forni et al., 2010). The
system to be controlled is open-loop unstable and is character-
ized by the matrices
A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(47)
The state-feedback matrix is given by
K =
[−2.1961 −0.7545
−0.7545 −2.7146
]
(48)
The control system parameters are γ1 = 1, γ2 = 2.1080,
α1 = 0.2779, α2 = 0.4497, ‖Φ‖ = 1.9021, ω1 = 0.5025,
ω2 = 15.1709 and µA = 1.5. Disturbance d and noise n are
random signals with uniform distribution in [−0.01, 0.01].
The network transmission rate is given by ∆ = 0.1s. As for the
actuator sampling period, Theorem 1 yields δ < 0.1508. We
select δ = 0.1s in order to synchronize the controller sampling
rate with ∆.
Figure 4 shows simulation results comparing the co-located
architecture in (Feng and Tesi, 2016) with the one proposed
in this paper. We consider a sustained DoS attack with variable
period and duty cycle, generated randomly. Over a simulation
horizon of 50s, the DoS signal yields |Ξ(0, 50)| = 34.65s and
n(0, 50) = 39. This corresponds to values (averaged over 50s)
of η ≤ 3.1, κ ≤ 0.8442, τD ≈ 1.2821 and T ≈ 1.4430, and
∼ 70% of transmission failures. Moreover,
Fig. 4. Simulation results for the example in case disturbance and noise
are random signals with uniform distribution in [−0.01, 0.01]. Top:
Co-located architecture; Middle: Remote architecture without buffering;
Bottom: Remote architecture with buffering (h = 5).
∆
τD
+
1
T
≈ 0.7710 (49)
For the co-located architecture, the requirement for closed-loop
stability is clearly satisfied.
Consider next the remote architecture. In agreement with (35),
to get stability one needs a prediction horizon hδ ≥ 4.9153,
which corresponds to h ≥ 50. One sees from Figure 4 that
without buffering, namely when h = 1, the closed-loop system
is unstable. On the other hand, h = 5 is sufficient to obtain a
satisfactory closed-loop response. The results indicate that in
some cases, like the one discussed here, small values of h can
approximate well the co-located architecture without actually
requiring large h or co-location. In this sense, the proposed
control architecture provides an effective solution to trade-off
ease of implementation and robustness against DoS.
The conservativeness of the theoretical bound on h is somewhat
implicit to the “worst-case” type of analysis pursued here.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have investigated networked systems in the
presence of Denial-of-Service attacks, comparing co-located
and remote control architectures. While the former achieves
the highest level of robustness for a very large class of DoS
signals, it need not be always feasible from a practical point
of view. We introduced a control architecture that approxi-
mates co-location while enabling remote implementation. This
architecture relies on “packet-based” control: the control unit
transmits a sequence of controls containing process input pre-
dictions. Whenever communication is allowed, the controls are
stored in a buffer and used during the DoS periods. We studied
closed-loop stability, quantifying the robustness “gap” between
this architecture and the co-located one. As it emerges from
both the analysis and the numerical simulations, the proposed
architecture provides an effective solution for trading-off ease
of implementation and robustness against DoS.
The present results can be extended in many directions. The
case of partial state measurements represents an interesting
research venue, where the results in (Feng and Tesi, 2017)
may prove relevant in this regard. Another interesting research
line pertains the study of remote control architecture when
sensor and actuator channels are independent. In this case, it
is interesting to study closed-loop stability in connection with
asynchronous DoS.
Appendix A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Consider any interval [zm,min{zm + hδ, zm+1}[, m ∈ N0.
The proof is divided into two steps. First, we provide an upper
bound on the error dynamics φ at the sampling times zm + pδ.
Second, we provide an upper bound on the error dynamics φ
between inter-samplings. This provides an upper bound on φ
over the whole interval [zm,min{zm + hδ, zm+1}[.
We start by deriving an upper bound on ‖φ(zm + pδ)‖. It is
simple to verify that the dynamics of the variable α related to
the predictor equation satisfies
αp(zm) = A
p
δ α0(zm) +
p−1∑
k=0
Ap−k−1δ BδK αk(zm)
(A.1)
for all p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h − 1} such that zm + pδ < zm+1.
Moreover, the process dynamics satisfies
x(t) = eA(t−zm)x(zm) +
∫ t
zm
eA(t−τ)Bu(τ)dτ
+
∫ t
zm
eA(t−τ)d(τ)dτ (A.2)
for all t ∈ R≥zm . Combining these two expressions, we get
φ(zm + pδ) = αp(zm)− x(zm + pδ)
= eApδn(zm)−
∫ zm+pδ
zm
eA(zm+pδ−τ)d(τ)dτ
(A.3)
for all p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h− 1} such that zm + pδ < zm+1. Here,
we exploited the relation Apδ = e
Apδ and the fact that
∫ zm+pδ
zm
eA(zm+pδ−τ)Bu(τ)dτ
=
p−1∑
k=0
[∫ zm+(k+1)δ
zm+kδ
eA(zm+pδ−τ)Bdτ
]
Kαk(zm)
=
p−1∑
k=0
eAδ(p−k−1)
[∫ δ
0
eAsBds
]
Kαk(zm)
=
p−1∑
k=0
Ap−k−1δ BδKαk(zm) (A.4)
where the second equality is obtained using the change of
variable s = zm + (k + 1)δ − τ . We then have
‖φ(zm + pδ)‖ ≤ ρ1‖wt‖∞ (A.5)
where ρ1 := (1 + 1µA )e
µA(h−1)δ .
We can now provide an upper bound on the prediction error φ
between inter-sampling instants. To this end, observe that the
dynamics of φ satisfies
φ˙(t) = −x˙(t)
= Aφ(t)− Φαp(zm)− d(t), t ∈ Ip(zm) (A.6)
where φ(zm) = n(zm). Let now
f(t− zm − pδ) :=
∫ t
zm+pδ
eµA(t−τ)dτ (A.7)
where t ∈ Rzm+pδ . Then, the solution of (A.6) satisfies
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ eµA(t−zm−pδ)‖φ(zm + pδ)‖
+κ1f(t− zm − pδ)(‖dt‖∞ + ‖αp(zm)‖)
≤ ρ1ρ2‖wt‖∞ + κ1f(t− zm − pδ)‖dt‖∞
+κ1f(t− zm − pδ)(‖φ(t)‖+ ‖x(t)‖) (A.8)
for all t ∈ Ip(zm), where we defined ρ2 := max{eµAδ, 1} and
κ1 := max{‖Φ‖, 1}.
Observe that f(0) = 0 and that f(t−zm−pδ) is monotonically
increasing with t. Thus, any positive real δ such that
f(δ) ≤ 1
κ1
σ
(1 + σ)
(A.9)
ensures (21) with ρ := σ + ρ1ρ2(1 + σ).
The explicit expression for δ follows from Theorem 1. 
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